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Abstract:  
This paper looks at an institutional innovation in which Western investors lend peer-to-
peer to poor country enterprises. Using a unique dataset from an online lending platform 
called MyC4, we find that MyC4’s Western lenders grant lower interest rates to pro-poor, 
socially responsible (SR), and pro-female African projects, thus internalizing positive 
externalities. Using novel instrumental variables to account for interest rates’ 
endogeneity, we find that these lower interest rates substantially improve the repayment 
performance of borrowers, and do not reflect profit-maximizing behavior. This new way 
to organize finance improves credit market efficiency and the success rate of poor 
country enterprises. 
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I Introduction
Between 50 and 80 percent of adults in many developing countries still have inadequate
access to nancial services (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2007), which translates into approxi-
mately 3 billion individuals worldwide. Because credit markets su¤er from asymmetric
information and limited liability (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), potential entrepreneurs with
low collateral may not be able to borrow funds for start-up capital or to increase the liq-
uidity of their businesses, or can only do so at very high interest rates. As a consequence,
they are left to opt for other less rewarding occupations or operate their businesses at
ine¢ ciently low levels, thus creating poverty traps(Banerjee et al., 1993).
To overcome these information and liability constraints, banks and micronance
institutions (MFIs ) have traditionally focused on a variety of instruments ranging from
down payments and joint liability lending to reliance on credit agencies. This paper
focuses on the existence of a di¤erent phenomenon that may increase outreach: the value
that lenders attach to externalities generated by poor country entrepreneurs as they carry
out their businesses. Examples of externalities generated by poor country businesses may
include the reduction of poverty and child mortality, the promotion of gender equality,
or spillovers for the community in the case of projects that focus on things such as
education or health. If lenders value these outcomes as positive externalities and are able
to internalize them, they should then be willing to decrease interest rates for these pro-
poor, socially responsible(subsequently SR), and pro-female projects, thus increasing
the outreach of credit markets.
In practice, however, even if lenders value these externalities, they are typically di¢ -
cult to internalize. Traditional banks have a prot-only motivation, while aid agencies,
which do explicitly value these externalities, generally incur very high transaction costs
in reaching small-scale entrepreneurs. Further, MFIs, which face lower transaction costs
due to their proximity and scale, are moving towards an increasingly competitive model
of for-prot lending as policy makers and donors encourage them to reduce their reliance
on subsidies (Morduch, 2000). As of 2006, MFIs had reached 113 million clients1, much
less than the billions of individuals still without access to banking services.
To determine whether some investors value potential positive externalities, we turn
to an institutional innovation, a new online Danish lending platform called MyC42,
whose peer-to-peer feature should enable investors to internalize positive externalities
generated by poor country entrepreneurs through a warm glowe¤ect. We collected a
unique dataset of 8,163 individual investors bidding to invest small amounts with varying
interest rates on 4,057 di¤erent business projects in six African countries. On any given
day, MyC4 investors are given a menu of potential loans. Some projects are pro-poor
(i.e. ,they are small, lack collateral, or are recently launched), some others are SR (i.e.,
1State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2006,
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2006/SOCR06.pdf
2www.MyC4.com
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they provide employee training or are deemed by MyC4 to address the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals), and/or some are pro-female (e.g. undertaken by a
female). Multiple investors can provide nancing to one loan, with the nal interest rate
a weighted average of the successful bids, which are determined through a competitive
Dutch auction bidding process. Investors must decide carefully how to allocate their
loan portfolio: in the case of default, MyC4 clearly states that MyC4 investors may lose
their investments3.
We collect and codify all the information that is available to investors, including
text descriptions and pictures, and carry out a two-step procedure to test whether some
investors value these potential positive externalities. First, we explore which business
characteristics command lower interest rates through the bidding process. The unique
set-up of the MyC4 platform allows us to circumvent common identication di¢ cul-
ties. In particular, omitted variables in the determination of interest rates are unlikely
a concern since we observe the same information as the investors on the website plat-
form. Holding everything else equal, we nd that pro-poor, SR, or pro-female projects
command signicantly lower interest rates on the MyC4 platform.
Second, we estimate loan repayment rates as a function of these characteristics condi-
tional on the interest rate. As interest rates and repayments rates are jointly determined,
we use exogenous changes in the supply of investors (caused by newspaper articles fea-
turing the website, Danish holidays, technical di¢ culties on the website, and weather
shocks) to isolate the causal impact of variations in interest rates on loan repayments by
African entrepreneurs. This approach is unique in the sense that it is the rst to use the
peer-to-peer features to identify the impact of interest rates on repayment. Consistent
with a moral hazard model whereby lower interest rates allow the entrepreneur to ap-
propriate more of the businessprots, and thus increase e¤ort and chances of success,
we nd relatively large repayment elasticities with respect to the (instrumented) inter-
est rate. As a result, the impact of these interest rate reductions on the success of the
businesses is substantial. The sample average default rate is 8.3 percent; however, the
default rate for businesses with discounted interest rates were drastically reduced. For
example, default rates of starting businesses, businesses providing employee training,
and businesses related to maternal health are reduced by 94, 27, and 93 percent, respec-
tively. Conditional on the interest rate, these projects do not have better repayment.
The net e¤ect on return for lenders of decreased interest rates and increased repayment is
negative, indicating that these discounts do not reect prot-maximizing behavior. We
thus conclude that investors are also pro-social, and internalize a range of positive exter-
nalities. As such, this feature of peer-to-peer lending increases the chances of success for
pro-poor, SR, and pro-female entrepreneurs, while borrowing from a prot-maximizing
lender would not.
3What is my guarantee that I will see a return on my loan investment?
All investments are potentially risky, and there is no guarantee that you will see a return on your
investment.http://myc4.com/Portal/WebForms/About/Default.aspx?NameKey=MAIN_FAQ
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The overall potential of this institutional innovation is an open question. However,
there are some indications that it is large. As shown in Figure 1, MyC4 has experienced
rapid growth (an average of a 15 percent per month increase in the number of investors
on the platform in 2008), and while nearly three quarters of its investors still come
from Denmark, 88 nationalities are already represented. Individuals may also nd it an
attractive alternative to more traditional aid agencies, a market which in 2007 totaled
$18.51 billion US (an increase of 26 percent over 2006)4.
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the implications of the canonical
moral hazard model applied to credit markets, with the added assumption that projects
generate a positive externality that is internalized by lenders. Section 4 summarizes the
MyC4 data. Section 5 analyzes the determinants of interest rates. Section 6 relates
project characteristics and interest rates to repayment. Section 7 concludes.
II Literature
This analysis contributes to the growing literature that seeks to understand the moti-
vations underlying pro-social behavior, which is di¢ cult to reconcile with the precept
of self-interested behavior that underlies much of economic theory (Andreoni, 2006).
Andreoni (2006) denes warm glow as the added utility from the mere fact of giving .
As such, it is complementary to altruism5. Laboratory experiments have found strong
evidence in support of a warm glow term in preferences (Andreoni, 1993, Andreoni, 1995,
Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997, and Andreoni and Miller, 2002). However, Andreoni (2006)
argues that warm-glow giving only provides a partial answer to the question: why do
people give? In this paper, we ne-tune this model by providing a reason as to why
investors make a gift (in the form of discounted interest rates) to only some projects:
the presence of positive externalities generated by certain aspects of these projects. Our
ndings also lend support to other recent evidence that people are willing to pay more
for private goods if there is a public goods component added (so-called impure public
goods). For example, Elfenbein and McManus (2009) compare items sold on eBays
Giving Works charity auction program with similar objects o¤ered contemporaneously
in non-charity eBay auctions, and nd that consumers pay about 6 percent more, on
average, for items when some or all of their payment goes to a charitable auction.
Our paper also relates to several recent papers using a US online peer-to-peer lend-
ing website called Prosper.com that focuses mainly on consumer loans. For example,
Duarte et al. (2009) nd that people perceived as trustworthy on the basis of their
appearance in a photograph receive lower interest rates conditional on funding of the
4OECD Stat. 2009. Organization for Economic Coorporation and Development, ODA Flows 2006,
2007, Tables 12 and 13.
5Unlike altruism, giving is not crowded out by involuntary government giving nanced by taxation.
Using a regression discontinuity approach on the bid level data with loan xed e¤ects, we do not nd
evidence that investments by the Danish Ministry of Foreign A¤airs crowd out bidding by private
investors (results available on request)
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loan, and have lower default rates, also accounting for credit scores. While they do not
seek to disentangle investorsprot motives from their pro-social motives, their ndings
do support the idea that private investors will use other signals besides business charac-
teristics to make their decision. More closely related is the paper by Pope et al. (2008),
which also relies on Prosper.com and nds some evidence that would be consistent with
pro-social behavior by investors toward blacks. In particular, while they nd that black
entrepreneursprojects fetch higher interest rates than white entrepreneurs with sim-
ilar credit proles, and indeed have higher default rates, the higher interest rate does
not su¢ ciently o¤set the greater default (i.e., a lower overall return relative to whites).
The authors interpret these ndings as evidence of a combination of accurate statistical
discrimination against blacks coupled with taste-based discrimination against whites.
However, unlike MyC4, where 93 percent of the loans get funded and disbursed (an even
higher percentage gets funded but not everyone takes up the loan), only 8 percent of
loans on Prosper.com get funded, raising an obvious concern of sample selection when
analyzing repayment data. In addition, as Prosper.com borrowers and lenders reside
in the same geographical location (the US), it is di¢ cult to identify instruments for
the interest rate that would provide the exogenous source of variation needed in order
to test whether signals, such as race or trustworthiness, a¤ect repayment. In contrast
to the purely reduced-form approach of the existing literature, we analyze the mecha-
nisms through which project characteristics that likely reect the presence of positive
externalities a¤ect interest rates, which in turn a¤ect repayment rates.
Lastly, our paper relates to the literature analyzing the impact of interest rates on
repayment for poor individuals. Due to the endogeneity of the interest rate to repayment,
this literature is very small. In a randomized experiment with a for-prot South African
lender focusing on consumer loans among a pool of 50,000 former clients, Karlan and
Zinman (2008) nd that higher interest rates decrease take-up and repayment rates.
Further, Dehejia et al. (2005) exploit quasi-experimental evidence from a traditional
microlender operating in the slums of Dhaka, which increased the interest rate at a
later time in two of its three branches to equal that o¤ered at a newly opened third
branch. Their di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach nds that the increase in interest rates
resulted in borrowers taking smaller, more frequent loans, and repay more quickly. We
are not aware of any other developing country evidence. Our paper di¤ers from this
literature in two major ways. First, we focus on the investorsperspective, as opposed
to the borrowersperspective. Thus, we extend the analysis by endogeneizing interest
rates and focusing on the positive externalities of the projects that might explain lower
interest rates, which in turn a¤ect repayment. Second, we use an instrumental variable
strategy to identify the causal impact of interest rates on repayment. While this strategy
has a potentially lower internal validity than randomized experiments, it nonetheless has
greater external validity as our results apply to the many countries (six in total) currently
served by MyC4.
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III Theory
The possibility for investors to internalize a potential positive externality generated by
a certain project may have three basic e¤ects: changing the interest rates, changing the
nature of the projects proposed by entrepreneurs, and reaching previously unfunded
entrepreneurs. First, to understand more clearly the e¤ect of the presence of a positive
externality E generated by a certain project on the interest rate r o¤ered, we turn to
the canonical moral hazard model in a partial equilibrium setting. Second, we analyze
the choice of projects of entrepreneurs with respect to E. Finally, we look at access to
credit for previously unfunded entrepreneurs.
III.1 Impact on the interest rate
Suppose a borrower chooses e 2 [0; 1] (e¤ort), which costs him c(e) = 1
2
ce2. A project
return can take on two values, R (highor success) and 0 (lowor failure) with
probability e and 1  e respectively. The opportunity cost of funds is  on the principal
plus interest rate. The opportunity cost of labor is u. The borrower has no cash, but
some illiquid assets worth w. The lender faces a limited liability constraint, and obtains
a return r when the project return is high, w when the project return is low. The
borrowers payo¤ b is thus:
b = e(R  r)  (1  e)w   1
2
ce2   u
While the lenders expected payo¤ l is:
l = er + (1  e)w   + E
E¤ort e is unobservable. The borrower chooses e so as to maximize his private payo¤.
The incentive-compatibility constraint (ICC) is thus:
e = arg max
e2[0;1]

e(R  r)  (1  e)w   1
2
ce2   u

Which yields e = R r+w
c
2 [0; 1]. The incentive-compatibility constraint can be rewritten
as:
r = w +R  ce
The underlying environment is that of competition: lenders compete for borrowers, which
drive their prots towards zero. The optimal contracting problem is:
max
e;r

e(R  r)  (1  e)w   1
2
ce2   u

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subject to:
er + (1  e)w   + E  0
r = w +R  ce
Combining the ICC and the zero prot constraint yields: er + (1   e)w    + E =
e(R ce)+w +E = 0. This yields a quadratic equation in e: ce2 eR+( w E) =
0. The solution is the bigger root, e =
R+
p
R2 4c( w E)
2c
. Corresponding to e, the
equilibrium interest rate is r = w +
R 
p
R2 4c( w E)
2
. The borrowers equilibrium
payo¤ is b =

R+
p
R2 4c( w E)
2
8c
  w   u.
Two testable predictions may be derived from this model. First, @r

@E
< 0; lenders
lower the equilibrium interest rates for projects generating a positive externality. The
intuition of this prediction is that the presence of an externality loosens the zero-prot
constraint. Lenders benet from this externality E, and are thus willing to lower interest
rates. For the same reason, @r

@R
< 0; the standard prediction that projects that have
a higher return fetch a lower interest rate. Second, @e

@E
> 0; borrowers whose projects
generate a positive externality E will, in equilibrium, exert greater e¤ort. This is an im-
mediate consequence of a moral hazard situation in which the presence of an externality
lowers the interest rate. As borrowers feel condent that they will retain more of their
prots, they exert more e¤ort. We will test the two predictions of this model using the
investment and repayment data from MyC4.
III.2 Impact on the nature of the projects
This partial equilibrium setting assumes that the externality E is exogenous. However,
entrepreneurs may choose their projects from many business plans with di¤ering levels of
externalities E. Thus, the MyC4 platform may inuence the choice of the projects. For
example, assume that an entrepreneur has the choice between a prot-focused project
with return R, with no positive externalities generated, and a SR project with lower re-
turnRSR (as a positive externality might be costly to produce), and a positive externality
E. The comparison of the prots b generated with the prot-focused or SR projects
yields the following condition on E for a SR project to be chosen: E > R
2 R2SR
4c
. This
means that if the returns RSR of a SR project are signicantly lower than a prot-focused
project, it will take a relatively high externality E (translating into a high interest rate
cut) for the entrepreneur to choose a SR project over a prot-focused project. The
distribution of the externalities E in the market will have an impact on the number of
SR projects, and thus the behavior of investors, in a general equilibrium setting. Besley
and Ghatak (2007) explicitly prove the existence of an equilibrium in a market where
neutral and caring agents interact with neutral and SR rms. While they develop the
analysis in terms of the product market, the basic tenet of their model also applies to
capital markets (p.1659).
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A testable implication of this theory is that the nature of the projects may change
over time, as entrepreneurs realize that they get discounted interest rates associated
with SR projects. However, in the data that we will later describe, we see no signicant
change in the nature of the projects over time. This might be due to the small time
frame in which MyC4 has been operating (since May 2007). It will be interesting to look
at the changing nature of the projects in the future.
III.3 Impact on the previously unfunded entrepreneurs
A further result from the model is that the externality E is observationally equivalent
to the collateral w in the above equations. In other words, it is as if the presence of
externalities enjoyed by the lenders brings a social collateral to the borrower, which
increases the equilibrium e¤ort level. Also note that there exists a solution to the
quadratic equation if and only if the discriminant is positive (i.e., R2 4c( w E)  0).
In the absence of a positive externality E and a low collateral w, a solution might not
exist if potential returns are low, and the cost of e¤ort, as well as the opportunity
cost of funds, is high. In other words, investors might not fund projects with low
collateral, as the losses associated with default are too high. The presence of a positive
externality E may modify this conclusion. This indicates that projects which may not be
funded by traditional nancial service providers, will be funded by peer-to-peer lending
if lenders benet from the positive externalities generated by the project. In this way,
the internalization of positive externalities may extend the reach of credit markets.
We will now describe the data and attempt to test the two predictions of this model,
concerning the impact of positive externalities on interest rates and repayment.
IV MyC4
To participate as a borrower, an entrepreneur must rst apply to a designated provider
in his/her respective country. Following an initial screening, this provider will upload the
loan application to the MyC4 website. After being granted approval by the MyC4 sta¤,
this submission will then be posted in the public domain as a loan application for lenders
to bid on. To inform their investment decisions, investors are provided with information
about each business plan, including the businessprotability and risk, a description of
the business activities, estimates of revenue generation, number of employees, and the
presence of di¤erent kinds of collateral. In addition, each business description contains
information on a number of direct and subtle indicators of potential positive externalities.
For example, MyC4 and its local country partner organizations can assign di¤erent icons
to business plans which indicate whether the business will contribute to one or more of
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. More subtle clues may include a
text description which mentions that the prots will be used to provide children with
schooling or a picture which shows that the employees are predominantly female.
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We collected all the information on business plans, bids, interest rates, and repayment
histories, which is publicly available on the MyC4 website6. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics on MyC4 borrowers, loans, and bids. There are a total of 4,057 business plans
on the website7, originating equally from men and women. The predominant activity is
to open or develop a shop. Most of the borrowers are self-employed (52 percent), and
have an address. MyC4 borrowers are relatively rich, with average previous year earnings
equal to 16,602 Euros (although it is not clear what the net earnings are). Earnings are
6,545 Euros at the median, and 1,800 Euros at the rst quartile ($6/day).
Loans can range from 100 Euros to 25,000 Euros, with a mean of 1,885 Euros. Loans
are generally repaid over 12 months, and almost all of the MyC4 borrowers provide
collateral that, in theory, covers a large part of the loan. Overall, more than 93 percent
of the projects are ultimately funded and taken up. A higher percentage is fully funded
but MyC4, the provider, or the borrower can deny taking up the loan, even if it is fully
funded. Investors are then reimbursed.
MyC4 investors, in a Dutch Auction system, bid to invest and compete on how low
of an interest rate they are prepared to accept. For example, suppose Investor A bids
10 Euros at 20 percent, and Investor B bids 10 Euros at 10 percent. The overall interest
rate will thus be a weighted average of the two interest rates, in this case 15 percent.
However, if the loan amount desired by the entrepreneur was only 10 Euros, Investor B
will outbid Investor A and fund the opportunity at an interest rate of 10 percent. The
nal loan is often a combination of several investors.
Bids range from 0.01 Euros to 21,866.65 Euros, with an average of 57.56 Euros. On
average, it takes 16 days and 72 bids to gather the required loan amount. As investors
outbid each other, the nal interest rate is often lower than the borrowers desired
interest rate. The average nal interest rate is 12.6 percent, lower than the average
13.7 percent requested. Once a loan is fully funded, MyC4 has the discretion to stop the
auction at any time. Once the auction is closed, MyC4 coordinates with the local lender,
a micronance institution in charge of channeling the funds and collecting repayments
(usually the same institution as the provider). Investors can then track the repayments
of their loans on the MyC4 website.
The agents involved in this transaction (MyC4, provider, lender) get interest commis-
sions and loan closing fees, which increase transaction costs. For comparability purposes,
MyC4 publishes the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) for each loan, which represents the
truecost of borrowing. As seen in Table 1, the average APR is 43.8 percent.
In the case that a borrower does not fulll the payback agreement with MyC4, the
local lender contacts the business. In general, text messages reminders will rst be sent
to the business before calling or personal visits. Borrowers that default are not permitted
to apply for new loans. Providers also have a strong incentive to seek repayments and
6www.MyC4.com
7As of January 6th, 2009
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maintain a reputation since they compete with other providers. In certain circumstances
the collateral can be seized.
V Determinants of interest rates
V.1 Methodology
In the empirical section, we follow the theoretical model explained in section III.1. We
found that the equilibrium interest rate is r = w +
R 
p
R2 4c( w E)
2
. Thus, we will
relate the interest rate given by MyC4 investors to a proxy of the potential positive
externality generated by the project, and also to other characteristics of the business
plans that may inuence the interest rate. We perform regressions of the following form:
interest_ratei = X 0i+ i
where i denotes a particular business plan. interest_ratei is the interest rate given by
investors to project i. We will use the total bid time necessary to fully fund project
i as another dependent variable measuring investors reaction. Xi are characteristics
of the business plans. We go to great lengths to collect all of the information about
these business plans present on the MyC4 website. There are four kinds of information
controlled for in the estimations. First, we include standard business characteristics,
such as the amount of the loan, income in the previous year, size of business, value of
collateral, type of business (shop, school, etc.), and the desired interest rate. Second,
information is gathered from a text that is provided by entrepreneurs which describes
their businesses. We develop a algorithm that searches for keywords corresponding to
the MyC4 Triple Bottom Line (We strive to be economically viable (prot), so-
cially responsible (people), and environmentally sound (planet))8. Third, small icons
describing the accordance of the business plan with United Nations Millennium Devel-
opment Goals are also quantitatively coded according to the number of icons present.
Fourth, each business plan is allowed a maximum of three pictures on the MyC4 site,
which are analyzed and coded by research assistants along ten dimensions9. These ten
8Words such as: business income expenditure records documentation log pay slip
protsalesellbuypurchasetradeand retailare searched for to quantify the prot bot-
tom line. Words like those included in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals are searched
for to quantify the SR bottom line (i.e., povertyhungerprimaryeducationgenderequal-
ityempowerwomenwomanchildmortalitymaternalhealthHIVAIDSmalaria
diseasesglobalpartnershipdevelopmentschoolsecondaryeducationtraininghealth
clinic hospital herbal pharmacymedical nurse chemist drug. Words such as envi-
ronment sustainable sustainability tree green are looked after to quantify the environment
bottom line.
9One dimension is a yes/no answer (Is there a woman on the pictures?), while the nine other
dimensions are rated on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 indicating less, and 5 indicating more. These dimensions
are assessed by the following questions: Do the people on the pictures appear rich?; Are the people
on the pictures dressed in a professional manner?; Is the project traditional or modern?; Is the
business plan self-explanatory (i.e., do I understand what the project is about by only looking at the
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dimensions include business characteristics (e.g., Are the people on the pictures pro-
fessionally dressed?) and elements likely to capture positive externalities (e.g., Is the
project good for the environment?), as well as certain stereotypes that have been found
to be important determinants of performance in the literature. For example, in a eld
experiment, Landry et al. (2006) nd that a one-standard deviation increase in physical
attractiveness among women solicitors increases the average gift substantially. Similarly,
in a public goods experiment, Andreoni and Petrie (2005) nd that in the absence of
information on actual contributions, beauty carries a premium, even though beautiful
people do not contribute more on average. To capture these phenomenons, we include,
for example: Is the entrepreneur attractive?. Moreover, to capture the impact of skin
color as in Pope et al. (2008), we include Is the entrepreneur less or more black?.
Finally, country dummies are included to control for the potentially diverse nature
of projects and economic conditions in di¤erent countries. Basic characteristics are also
included to compare similar business plans (e.g., the size of the loan, the payback period),
and as are year xed e¤ects to control for common macroeconomic shocks. The average
number of opportunities over the bidding days is included, and controls for the supply of
business plans, which may a¤ect investorsreaction. i is the disturbance term. Robust
standard errors are presented in brackets in the regression results.
The strategy presented in this paper allows us to capture most of the information
that is accessible to investors on the MyC4 website. Thus, we are able to create a
unique position in which we (the econometricians) have exactly as much information as
the MyC4 investor taking a decision on the interest rate. Although it could be argued
that an investor may read between the lines and judge the quality of a business
plan on unobserved variables, we will test our identication strategy by examining the
explanatory power of the regressions performed.
V.2 Results
We rst test whether business characteristics that likely generate positive externalities
command lower interest rates. Table 2 presents the results and includes the interest
rate in Column (1), and the total bid time in Column (2). Below we discuss the most
relevant ndings from this table.
The rst indication that investors may be giving interest discounts motivated by
warm glow, rather than prot maximization in a competitive market, is that relative to
farming business plans, health- and school-based business plans attract lower interest
rates, by 69 and 76 hundredth of a percentage point, i.e. basis points. In turn, farming
pictures)?; Is the project serious?; Does the entrepreneur on the pictures smile?; Is the project
good for women?; Is the project good for the environment?; Does the entrepreneur seem friendly?;
Is the entrepreneur attractive?; Is the entrepreneur more or less black?). Some business plans were
randomly asked to be coded twice by di¤erent research assistants to obtain a measure of inter-rater
reliability. The correlation between the ratings of the research assistants is 0.8, which conrms the
homogeneity of the codings.
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attracts a lower interest rate than shops, hotels, restaurants, and manufacturing. Our
model predicts that these results either reect the fact that health- and school-based
business plans acquire lower interest rates because of their higher returns R, or because
of the greater positive externality E they generate. A priori, one would expect that
health- and school-related businesses to generate lower returns than farming-, retail-,
manufacturing-, and hospitality-related businesses. The repayment analysis will inves-
tigate this in detail.
In terms of basic business characteristics, larger loans are assigned higher interest
rates, suggesting that either the returns to larger loans are smaller or that smaller loans
generate positive externalities. A surprising result that exemplies the presence of warm
glow in this type of lending, is that previous-year income is not associated with lower
interest rates, which typical loaning institutions would certainly take into consideration.
An even more surprising result, relative to the practices of typical banking, concerns
the collateral, whose presence actually increases the interest rate. However, this result
may be qualied depending on the type of collateral. Having as collateral a guarantee
by an individual, by a provider, or by a lender institution decreases the interest
rate, while more typical collateral, such as personal or business assets, have no e¤ects.
Unexpectedly, variables measuring the quality of the project have a limited impact on
interest rates. Some variables indicating project quality even have a negative impact on
interest rate. For example, the length of the text description, the presence of a business
website, being a prot- focused or established business, and appearing to be a serious
business (estimated from the pictures) all increase the interest rate. These businesses
pay an interest premium of between 3 basis points (for a prot-focused business) and
312 basis points (for an established business).
We further examine variables that capture the SR nature of the project. For example,
the fact that the project includes a training dimension appears to be important for
MyC4 investors, as it reduces the interest rate by 44 basis points. We also include
dichotomous variables indicating the presence of icons related to the United Nations
Millennium Development Goals. While each icon is not individually signicant, when
grouping these variables they become highly signicant (F-test statistic=4.12 ). This
might indicate a problem of multicollinearity, which we will address below.
Variables measuring the extent to which a project is geared towards women are also
included in the regressions and nd positive e¤ects. For example, the presence of an
icon that indicates that the project will improve maternal health signicantly reduces
the interest rate by 292 basis points, while each female employee in the business reduces
the interest rate by 3 basis points.
Findings regarding environmental variables are mixed. On the one hand, business
plans indicating that the project is good for the environment decreases the interest rate
by 22 basis points. On the other hand, the mention of the environment in the project
description raises the interest rate by 19 basis points. However, these discrepancies may
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be attributable to a problem of multicollinearity.
Variables measuring the size of the rm show that MyC4 investors act more favorably
towards smaller rms. Dichotomous variables measuring the nature of MyC4 borrowers
are also included in the regressions. For example, a dummy indicates if a large orga-
nization (e.g., the Danish Ministry) invests in a particular opportunity. The presence
of a large organization increases the interest rate by 1.5 percentage points. This likely
reects that these large organizations o¤er signicantly higher interest rates since, as
mentioned above, there is no evidence that these investments crowd out the investment
of private investors.
Finally, four variables are included that may reect the previously mentioned possible
stereotypes. A smile on the pictures is correlated with lower interest rates, with results
showing that a business with pictures indicating people who are 5 = smiling a lot
having a decreased interest rate by almost 19 basis points compared to a business with
pictures of individuals who are 1 = not at all smilingLooking more friendly or being
attractive do not seem to have an impact on interest rates. However, having darker
skinned color does decrease the interest rate; with results showing that a business with
pictures indicating people who are 5 = dark skin color having a decreased interest
rate by 39 basis points compared to a business with pictures of individuals who are 1
= light skin color. This might be evidence of positive discrimination in favor of darker
skinned people, unless darker skinned people have better repayment rates.
Thus far, results suggest that MyC4 investors derive positive externalities from var-
ious business characteristics such as being pro-poor, SR, and pro-women. Furthermore,
the high R-squared of the regressions (0.71 and 0.45 in Columns (1) and (2)) indicate
that our identication strategy, based on capturing most of the information on the MyC4
website to avoid the problem of omitted variable bias, is valid.
However, these results are subject to multicollinearity. As multicollinearity reduces
the signicance of coe¢ cients, the insignicant e¤ect of most variables on interest rates
might mean that they are truly insignicant, or that they are collinear with other vari-
ables. For example, the correlation between the sex of the entrepreneur and the fact
that there is a woman on the picture is -0.73. For this reason, we aggregate the variables
that are classied as being in the same category. Our method of aggregation is a princi-
pal components analysis (PCA). A PCA reduces the number of dimensions (variables),
without losing much information, by diagonalizing the variance-covariance matrix of
the variables in each category, and selecting the eigenvector associated with the high-
est eigenvalue, as the rst principal component accounts for as much of the variability
in the data as possible. However, this reduction in dimensionality comes at a cost of
interpretation, as an eigenvector does not have a natural interpretation.
We construct a score for each of the seven variable categories: socially responsible
investment, gender, environment, collateral, quality of project, size of rm, and signal
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from other investors. In Table 3, we present regressions of the following form:
interest_ratei = 1score_SRIi + 2score_genderi + 3score_greeni +X 0i+ i
Column (1) of Table 3 presents the results. The scores for SR investment, and
gender (a higher score indicates pro-female) are signicantly related to lower interest
rates. One may interpret the results using the standard deviation of the scores. The
standard deviation of the SR score is 1.44, while the coe¢ cient is -0.108. Thus, a project
two standard deviations more SR(moving from the mean to the top two percent of
the distribution of the SR score) will get a 31 basis point reduction in the interest rate.
Similarly, Column (2) shows that the standard deviation of the gender score is 1.77, while
the coe¢ cient is -0.071. Thus, a project two standard deviations more female(moving
from the mean to the top two percent of the distribution of the gender score) will get a
25 basis point reduction in interest rate. No signicant e¤ect of the environment score
is found in Column (3).
A concern might be that these three scores are also collinear. For instance, a SR
project might also be more likely to be undertaken by a woman. Column (4) addresses
this concern by including the three scores together. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients, as
well as their signicance, remains stable, indicating that the identication of the impact
of these scores are not a¤ected by multicollinearity. As additional robustness checks, we
then include incrementally more control variables. In Column (5), we include the full
set of control variables from Table 2. In Column (6), instead of including each variable
one by one, we include the other scores. The coe¢ cients of the SR and gender score
remain signicant, and of the same magnitude, independently of the set of controls used.
Column (6) presents the preferred parsimonious specication, and still explains much of
the variation in the interest rate. Column (7) repeats the exercise with the total bid time
as a dependent variable and nds similar results for the coe¢ cients of the SR and gender
score. Lastly, note in Column (6) that collateralized projects, high quality projects, and
projects carried out by larger businesses all command higher interest rates.
The results presented in this section indicate that projects which are pro-poor, SR,
and pro-female get a signicant reduction in the interest rate. We now turn to repayment
and test whether these reductions reect the fact that these projects generate higher
returns, or that investors experience a warm glow as they internalize the externality
generated by these projects.
VI Determinants of repayment
VI.1 Methodology
We turn to the determinants of repayment. We estimate the incentive compatibility
constraint e = 1
c
(r   R   w), where e is e¤ort and, in this particular model, the prob-
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ability of repayment. We thus relate the repayment probability to the interest rate.
Note that the positive externality E does not enter as a direct determinant e, as it is
internalized through the determination of r10. We include the scores from Table 3 to
proxy for potentially heterogeneous returns R across projects. This model will measure
the elasticity of repayment to interest rates of di¤erent projects, as well as repayment
performance, net of the interest rate.
We will perform regressions of the following form:
repaymenti = 0+1interest_ratei+1score_SRIi+2score_genderi+3score_greeni+X
0
i+i
We will use two measures of repayment. The rst measure of repayment that will
be used is the amount that the borrower is in arrears as a proportion of the total
amount that was owed (principal and interest) when the loan was signed. This enables
us to include the approximately two-thirds (67%) of borrowers in our sample which are
still in the process of repaying. The second measure will be the default among the
borrowers whose loan cycle was complete. The average proportion owed for the full
sample (including defaulters and borrowers still in their repayment cycle) was 0.093,
with the lowest value being -0.91 (someone who was repaying early) and the highest
value 1.1611. In the sample of completed loans, the average gure was similar: 0.097.
Default, as decided upon by MyC4 and the local partners, stood at 8.33%.
Xi includes the full set of controls from Table 3. As the interest rate is endogenous to
the repayment performance, we use instrumental variables to isolate the causal impact
of the interest rates on repayment. Specically, we look for events that cause exogenous
shocks to the level of competition between investors and/or investment decision-making.
Given that MyC4 is a new organization that started to o¤er loans in 2007 through
primarily Danish investors, we identify ve possible sources of exogenous variation in the
supply of investors. The rst is whether MyC4 is mentioned in one of Denmarks main
daily newspapers. Between November 2007 and December 2008, we found 38 newspaper
articles (an average of approximately one article every three weeks) in seven mainstream
Danish newspapers, which may increase the number of investors on the MyC4 website.
The second exogenous source of variation is the proportion of bidding days which fell on
a Danish holiday, which number 12 per year. One may hypothesize that Danish investors
are less likely to browse the MyC4 website on a holiday, as they might be disconnected
from the internet. On the other hand, investors might have more time to visit the
website on such a day. The third is the proportion of bidding days during which MyC4
reported technical di¢ culties on their website. There were eight such occurrences in
2008. It is technically impossible to visit the website on such a day, one may thus expect
a lower number of investors on business plans which bidding days coincide with technical
10r = w + R 
p
R2 4c( w E)
2
11because of interest accrual on the late amount it is possible to have a value greater than 1.
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di¢ culties. The fourth is the proportion of bidding days during which a weather event
was reported at Kastrup Airport, just outside Copenhagen12. A weather event is either
the reporting of rain (or drizzle), fog, snow (or ice pellets), or thunder. For the
average business plan, there was a weather event reported for exactly half of all bidding
days. Finally, the fth instrumental variable is actual precipitation in millimeters (mm).
The average business plan experienced 1.55 mm of precipitation during each of the
bidding days. These adverse weatherdays might be correlated with more investors on
the website, as investors stay home on such days, and have more time to visit the MyC4
website.
Theoretically, it is possible for these instrumental variables to have an e¤ect on the
number of investors on the MyC4 website. However, it is unclear how an increased
number of investors may impact interest rates. A standard argument predicts that more
investors would increase the funds available, and result in higher competition and lower
interest rates. However, according to the law of large numbers, an increase in investors
should also more accurately predict the true default rate. Thus, if the business plans
risks are overestimated by a small number of investors, then interest rates will fall when
more investors join. If, on the other hand, the business plansrisks are underestimated,
interest rates will increase with more investors. As it is impossible to disentangle these
mechanisms, we can only measure the net e¤ect in practice. Finally, the instruments may
also a¤ect the interest rates di¤erently on di¤erent projects. For example, a newspaper
article may attract certain types of investors to the MyC4 website, which may benet
some projects but not others.
VI.2 Results
Table 4 presents the results pertaining to the determinants of repayment. Column (1)
estimates repayment as a function of the instrumented interest rate, as well as of the
variables included in the preferred specication from Column (6) of Table 3 with two
instrumental variables: Average number of bidding days in which MyC4 appeared in a
newspaper article, and Average number of bidding days which were Danish holidays.
These two variables are signicantly related to the interest rate. For example, the
interest rate signicantly lowers for plans with bidding days coinciding with the presence
of a newspaper article mentioning MyC4. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
more investors are attracted to the MyC4 website when it received publicity, which in
turn increases competition and reduces the interest rates. Similarly, the interest rate
signicantly increases for plans with bidding days coinciding with a Danish holiday.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that there are less investors connected to
the internet during vacation periods, which in turn decreases competition on the MyC4
website, and increases the interest rates.
Column (2) presents the instrumental variable regressions, where the interest rate is
12http://freemeteo.com/default.asp?pid=155&la=1&gid=2621951&monthFrom=1&yearFrom=2008&sid=061800
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instrumented with the two instrumental variables described above. The interest rate is
positively related to the probability of repayment, conrming the theoretical predictions.
Column (3) includes the full set of controls. As shown in Column (3), a one percentage
point increase in the interest rate is associated with a 4.2 percentage point increase
in the arrears as proportion of the total loan amount that was due at the signing of
the loan. This increase is very large considering that the average arrears stood at 9.3
percent. Statistical tests of the validity of the identication strategy are shown at the
bottom of Table 4. The Hansen test is a test of over-identifying restrictions, typically
calculated as an R-squared from a regression of the instrumental variable residuals on
the full set of instruments, and is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity (as
opposed to Sargans test). Under the null hypothesis, the statistic is distributed as a
chi-squared in the number of over-identifying restrictions, and a rejection of the test
casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. Results indicate that the p-value is
0.90 in Column (3), conrming the validity of the instruments. The Cragg-Donald F
statistic tests for the presence of weak instruments, and is equivalent to a test of the
partial correlation between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressors in
question. In Columns (2) and (3), the instrumental variables are signicantly related to
the interest rate and thus cannot be considered weak instruments.
The size of the coe¢ cient estimate suggests that moral hazard is a serious concern.
Another theory, based on negative shocks received by entrepreneurs, could explain a pos-
itive relationship between interest rates and worse repayment. If projects with di¤ering
interest rates are compared, projects with higher interest rates might be closer to their
break-even rates. A negative shock received by these projects might negate prots, and
lead to involuntary default. More precisely, suppose that there are two projects with
a break-even rate of 13.5%. Project 1 receives a loan at 13%, while Project 2 receives
a loan at 12%. A negative shock of 1% in project returns will make Project 1 default,
whereas Project 2 can still repay. Thus, a higher interest rate may be correlated with
higher rates of default due solely to shocks. First note that in a large sample, shocks
will be distributed evenly and independently from the interest rate. Thus, there should
be no reason why Project 1 would experience more shocks than Project 2. There is still
an issue if the break-even rate is close to the interest rate. Thus, the analysis performed
in Table 4 might measure moral hazard, or the di¤erential e¤ect of the same shocks on
projects with di¤ering interest rate.
To explore this alternative shockexplanation, in Column (4) we restrict the sample
to projects for which the di¤erence between the desiredinterest and nal interest rate
is greater than 3 percentage points in favor of the borrower, which applies to 25% of the
sample. The underlying assumption is that the desired interest rate is close to the break-
even rate. Thus, projects with a high di¤erence between the desired and nal interest
rate are less likely to su¤er from negative shocks. This regression tests for the presence
of moral hazard when the occurrence of shocks leading to default is less likely. We nd
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that the coe¢ cient on the interest rate is still signicantly positive, even for projects
further from their break-even rate, casting doubt on this alternative explanation13.
The results presented in Table 4 might be sensitive to the denition of repayment
used. To test this hypothesis, we use another measure of repayment. Column (5) restricts
the sample to loans fully repaid or classied as defaulted (no further repayments are
expected). The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, taking the value 1if the
loan is in default, or 0if it is fully repaid. The estimation is an instrumental variable
probit regression14. Results are similar when using this alternate measure of repayment.
Again, default is very sensitive to exogenous increases in the interest rate; a 1 percentage
point increase raises the default probability (evaluated at the average estimated default
of 11.3%) by 8.7 percentage points.
To test whether characteristics that commanded lower rates in the bidding reect
improved repayment, we must look at the other explanatory variables, which measure
the potentially di¤erent returns across projects, net of the interest rate. As shown in
Column (3), the coe¢ cients on the scores for SR investment, and gender (developed in
Table 3) are insignicantly positive and the coe¢ cient on score for the project quality is
insignicantly negative. This shows that SR, pro-poor, and gender focused projects do
not have greater returns. Table 3 shows that these projects command lower interest rates.
MyC4 investors do not o¤er lower interest rates to these projects because they repay
more, but because they generate positive externalities that MyC4 investors internalize.
Similarly, darker-skinned borrowers are no less likely to have arrears. Women are more
likely to default than men. The one exception to this is the variable smile, which
commands both a lower interest rate and is signicantly less likely to be associated with
either arrears or default. However, since a smile, unlike the other variables, is unlikely
to generate a positive externality, this result shows that MyC4 investors are correct in
asserting that the person is smiling for a reason; s/he must be generating a higher return.
VI.3 Robustness checks
Table 5 presents the repayment estimations that also include the other instrumental
variables. Deaton (2009) criticizes the instrumental variables approach for evaluating
causal impacts, based on the argument that if heterogeneity is present, the probability
limit of the IV estimator will depend on the choice of instrument (Heckman, 1997). As
such, it sheds light on a very particular sample of the data, which, in this case, includes
business plans with di¤ering exposure in their bidding period to newspaper articles about
MyC4 or to Danish holidays. Thus, we attempt to use other instrumental variables to
show the robustness of our results to the choice of the instrumental variables.
In Column (1), we use the Average number of bidding days in which the MyC4
13Results hold for a di¤erence of 1, 2, or 4 percentage point between the desired interest rate and the
nal interest rate.
14Marginal e¤ects at the mean are presented.
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website had a technical problemas an instrumental variable. This might also be linked
to the number of investors, but not to the repayment performance of entrepreneurs
other than through the interest rate. Indeed, more technical problems are associated
with an increased interest rate, although not signicantly. The Cragg-Donald F statistic
of the rst stage is 35.0, indicating that the instruments are signicantly correlated with
the interest rate, and the over-identication test is not rejected. Column (2) shows
the instrumental variable regression, with a remarkably stable coe¢ cient of the interest
rate. Columns (4) and (6) include incrementally the Average number of bidding days
with a weather event, and Average number of bidding days with high precipitations,
with little change in the coe¢ cient. The results are therefore robust to the choice of
instruments.
Column (7) looks at the possibility that SR projects might be disproportionately
a¤ected by moral hazard. It may be possible that some untalented entrepreneurs may
know about the lower interest rates granted for SR projects, and act strategically by
labeling themselves SR to benet from a loan. Although claiming to be socially respon-
sible, strategic default may be more prevalent among these so-called SR projects. Thus,
we interact the interest rate with the SR score to test for a di¤erential impact of the
interest rate on SR projects. As seen in Column (7), it is not the case that SR projects
strategically default more than other projects.
Table 6 uses the same set of instrumental variables, but focuses solely on their values
during the last day of bidding. Indeed, it might be the case that the undercutting in
interest rates occurs near the end of the bidding process. As shown in Column (1), the
instruments are both signicant and not rejected by the over-identication test. Also,
the results are very similar to those above, indicating that our results are not sensitive
to the particular instrumental variable used.
VI.4 Discussion
Our results indicate that lenders value potential positive externalities. However, an im-
portant question that remains is by how much. As our analysis translates characteristics
into interest rate reductions, and variations in interest rates into repayment performance,
we can measure the value of di¤erent business characteristics.
Recall that the lenders expected payo¤ l is:l = er+(1 e)w +E: Therefore, if
it is not possible to retrieve the collateral, w = 0; then the expected payo¤ is er +E.
Now, take an individual investor i considering to raise the interest rate o¤ered on loan
j by 1 percentage point. To determine whether the return to the investor will be positive,
let ej be the proportion of the loan j that will be repaid (which stands at 90.7% since
arrears are 9.3%) and ri;j be the interest rate this investor charges; then li;j = ejri;j.
Further, let !i;j be the weight (proportion) that investor i contributes to loan j and rj
be the nal interest rate that the borrower j must pay; then rj =
Pn
i !i;jri;j. Recall
that the average nal interest rate rj was 12.6%, and since there are on average 72 bids
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that fund a loan, the average weight per loan is !j = (1=72). Finally, because repayment
ej depends on the nal interest rate, not the individual one, the relationship between
repayment and an individual interest charge is ej = f(rj) = f(
Pn
i !i;jri;j); where f
0
gives us the elasticity of repayment with respect to the nal interest rate, which is  4:2
as shown in Column (3) of Table 4.
Under the assumption that investors do not behave cooperatively, the marginal ben-
et (in percentage terms) for an investor considering charging loan j a 1 percentage
point higher interest rate than the average rate is given by:
@li;j
@ri;j
= ri;j
@ej
@ri;j
+ ej =
ri;j  f 0  !i;j + ej = (1:126)  (1=72)   4:2 + 0:907 = 0:841 > 0: In other words, each 1
percentage point increase in the interest rate charged translates into a 0.84 percentage
increase in the return received. Hence, the observation that pro-poor, SR, or pro-female
projects receive interest rate discounts reects a negative return to the average investor
and is not consistent with prot-maximizing behavior 15.
We can use this same calculation to estimate the overall warm glow value of a given
externality for a given project j. If, for the average investor an increase by 1 percentage
point in the interest rate raises the e¤ective return by 0.84 percentage points, and the
average loan size is Euro 1885, then this 1 percent increase has a value to this investor
of Euro 0.0084*(1/72)*1885 = 0.22. Since there are 72 such investment bids per loan,
the combined value of a 1 percentage point change for a given project is Euro 72*0.22
= 15.86. We nd that a project two standard deviations more SR (moving from the
mean to the top 2 percent of the distribution of the SR score) will get a 31 basis point
reduction in the interest rate, and a 25 basis point reduction in the case of female focus.
Hence, this reects a value of Euro 4.92 and 3.97, respectively. Similarly, the results
from Table 3 suggest that MyC4 investors value a school project at Euro 18.30 and a
health project at Euro 17.30 relative to hotels or restaurants. Lending to a business that
MyC4 indicates will improve maternal health is valued by as much as Euro 46.30, and
the warm glow value of a starting business is Euro 49.50. In light of average incomes
in these countries, these represent substantial amounts and show that there are large
e¢ ciency gains being generated through the peer-to-peer concept which enables investors
to internalize the positive externalities.
Based on the results from Column (5) in Table 4, we can also evaluate the impact
of these interest rate discounts on the success of the projects. Recall that the sample
average default rate is 8.33 percent. Due to the interest rate discounts given by investors,
default rates of businesses focusing on education or health are reduced by 43% and 40%,
respectively, and of a business providing training by 27 percent. Compared to the lightest
skinned entrepreneurs, the most dark skinned entrepreneurs are 25 percent less likely
15Note that if @ej@ri;j ' 0 because !i;j ' 0 or f 0 ' 0, then an individual investor is always strictly
better o¤ seeking the highest possible interest rate while still remaining part of the group of succesful
bidders. However, given the empirically large repayment elasticity with respect to the interest rate, f 0,
investors whose share !i;j of a given loan is larger than 19.3% will see a negative marginal benet to
raising interest rates; their optimal strategy should be to reduce interest rates until the repayment level
will statistically be equal to 100%.
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to default due to their interest rate. The largest impacts are found among businesses
in which MyC4 indicates they will benet maternal health and new businesses; their
discounts reduce the likelihood of default by 93 and 94 percent, respectively. This
suggests that the internalization of positive externalities is a key determinant enabling
pro-poor, SR, and pro-female projects to succeed.
The total potential for the global e¢ ciency gains is di¢ cult to estimate and de-
pends on the size of the market, both in terms of the overall size of the supply of these
characteristics by entrepreneurs in poor countries, and the potential size of the group
of MyC4 investors. We perform three tests to determine whether the current pool of
MyC4 investors provides any indication of the constraints on the size of the market.
These tests use the individual bid level information merged in with the business charac-
teristics. First, we investigate whether there are types of investors (with certain types
investing in certain types of projects), or whether investors bid on all types of projects
but give interest rate discounts to projects that are pro-poor, SR, or pro-female. We
thus consider the decision to invest or not on a particular business plan. In Column
(1) of Table 7, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1if the investor
is bidding a positive amount on a certain business plan, 0otherwise. Thus, the ob-
servations for a certain investor, on a certain day, are the menu of projects open for
funding. Controlling for investor xed-e¤ects, we still nd a signicant positive impact
of SR and pro-female projects, and a negative impact of collateral on the decision to
invest. Thus, it does not appear that there are di¤erent types of investors; instead these
results indicate that investors bid on many projects, and prefer projects that generate
a warm glow. Second, we provide an additional test to determine whether the sample
of investors can be split into a prot-maximizing group and a pro-social group, which
would provide some indication that not every investor that joins MyC4 indeed values
these externalities. We do so by splitting the investors into two groups: those investors
whose average interest rate o¤ered is above the median and those investors whose of-
fered average interest rate is below the median. We estimate the same model as in Table
4, but this time use the individual bid level information merged in with the business
characteristics. Results are presented in Table 7, Columns (2) and (3), and show that
the bid-level analysis generates very similar results. These results also show that both
groups of investors value SR and gender nearly the same on the margin. Finally, we test
whether new investors are driven more by prot motives than the earlier investors , as
one might expect if the pro-social group is more likely to select in rst. We test for this
by including a variable that indicates the order in which the investors rst participated
on the MyC4 website, with higher values representing more recent investors. We then
interact this variable with the di¤erent controls, and similarly add a time trend and
interactions between the time trend and the controls. Results are reported in Column
(4). We nd no evidence that newer investors value these positive externalities less. In
fact, new investors are more likely to give interest rate discounts to SR projects, gender
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projects, environmental projects, and higher interest rates to more established projects.
VII Conclusion
In this paper, we seek to answer a very basic question: do people value potential positive
externalities, net of loan repayments, when they lend to poor country enterprises? We
nd that MyC4 investors do, and that the MyC4 peer-to-peer lending platform enables
these investors to internalize the positive externalities, leading to substantial e¢ ciency
gains.
To establish this, we use the unique features of this lending platform to follow a
two-step procedure. First, we relate project characteristics to interest rates o¤ered. The
crucial feature of this analysis is that we are privy to the exact same information as
the online investors. Thus, we develop a methodology that captures all of the informa-
tion present in the business plans (quantitative data, text, icons, pictures) in order to
minimize omitted variable bias. We nd that pro-poor, SR, and pro-female projects re-
ceive signicant interest rate discounts from investors. Second, we verify whether these
projects are also performing better, on purely nancial grounds, in order to explore the
prot-maximizing behavior of MyC4 investors. We do this by relating project charac-
teristics and interest rates to loan repayment. In addition, we exploit the unique online
feature of MyC4 to develop ve novel instrumental variables likely to inuence interest
rates, but not the repayment performance of entrepreneurs (other than through their
impact on interest rates). These instrumental variables are: the presence of newspa-
per articles featuring the website, Danish holidays, technical di¢ culties on the website,
weather shocks, and precipitation. Consistent with a moral hazard model, we nd rela-
tively large repayment elasticities with respect to the (instrumented) interest rate. The
net e¤ect on return for lenders of decreased interest rates and increased repayment is
negative, indicating that these discounts do not reect prot-maximizing behavior. This
feature of peer-to-peer lending increases the chances of success for pro-poor, SR, and
pro-female entrepreneurs, while borrowing from a prot-maximizing lender would not.
The policy implication of this paper is straightforward: there exist investors willing to
subsidize projects which generate a positive externality. The presence of warm glow
helps credit markets reach projects that would maybe not be funded by more traditional
banks and enables these projects to succeed.
There are two caveats to these otherwise positive ndings. First, while the investors
o¤er relatively higher interest rates to, for example, established enterprises or modern
businesses, these may in fact, be greater drivers of employment than small scale tradi-
tional enterprises such as chicken rearing. This investment behavior therefore provides
an incentive for such more established entrepreneurs to either (1) move into more tra-
ditional enterprises, or (2) pretend that their businesses are actually less established,
less modern, more pro-female, and pro-SR than they really are. The former may hurt
22
overall economic growth performance, the latter will most likely dilute the ability of real
pro-poor, SR, and female-focused projects to signal these characteristics e¤ectively and
command lower interest rates. Whether this will happen will depend primarily on the
availability of credit alternatives for such established and modern enterprises. In a mar-
ket where there is competition between formal banks, such enterprises are likely to have
access to alternative sources of credit at favorable rates, thus pushing these borrowers
into this market rather than undertaking alternative traditionalenterprises or cheat-
ing on the signals given. In fact, to avoid an inux of established businesses cheating on
signals and reducing the ability of investors to internalize the positive externalities, pro-
poor, SR, and female-focused projects may actually benet from a certain interest rate
bu¤er between formal banks and rates o¤ered on the MyC4 website. Finally, whether
peer-to-peer micronance lending will extend outreach depends on the presence of sub-
stitution e¤ects between traditional avenues for charitable giving that, in turn, provide
loans to the poor (perhaps even at lower interest rates), and peer-to-peer lending. This
empirical question is beyond the scope of this paper but an important one to answer in
considering its impact on outreach.
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Figure 1: Number of active investors per month on the MyC4 website platform
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